Law Offices of Ference and Associates

Features







Home

Firm Profile

Features

Principal Profile

Litigation Experience

Patent Portfolio

Professional Activities and Publications

Fee Arrangements

Contacting Us

Advertising Injury -
General Overview

Advertising injury is typically defined in Commercial General Liability (CGL) insurance policies to constitute certain offenses, such as defamation, invasion of privacy, "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business," and "infringement of copyright, title, or slogan."

The phrases misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business refer, at least in general, to trade dress type claims.1 The former phrase, however, should extend to an idea for calling public attention to a product,2 and the latter phrase should extend to the comprehensive manner in which the claimant conducts its business.3 Occasionally, however, these phrases have been interpreted much more broadly.4

The phrase infringement of copyright, title, or slogan has been held not to encompass trademark infringement5 or patent infringement.6 The case law is inconsistent as to what the word title refers to. Some courts have given it a broad meaning.7 Other courts have given it a narrow meaning, because of the context in which it is used in the policy.8

Some policies include the offense of piracy in the definition of advertising injury. A couple of courts have held that since the term must be read in the context in which it is used in the policy, piracy means misappropriation or plagiarism found in the elements of the advertisement itself -- in its text form, logo, or pictures -- rather than in the product being advertised.9

Some, mostly older, policies include the term unfair competitionas one of the offenses listed in the definition of advertising injury. The words unfair competition should not be held to refer to a violation of any state or federal statutory right. Rather, the words unfair competition relate to conduct that a reasonable layperson would consider competition that is unfair - the conduct encompassed by the common law tort of unfair competition.10

Assuming the requisite offense is involved in the claim against the insured, one basic question remains. Was the offense by the insured committed in the course of advertising11 the insured's products? A causal nexus is required between the advertising and the offense.12 For example, it has been held that the requisite causal connection can exist with regard to a trademark infringement claim,13 but not a patent infringement claim. The manner in which the courts have handled coverage claims for patent infringement illustrates how the foregoing issue has been addressed.

Most courts have held that patent infringement is not covered under the advertising injury coverage part because patent infringement is not committed in or by advertising. Advertising is not even actionable; in fact, advertising is irrelevant to a patent infringement claim. The statutory offense of patent infringement consists of the making, using, or selling of the patented invention. Accordingly, it would be incorrect to say that the offense of patent infringement is committed in the course of advertising.14

[Back to Top]


1 See, eg., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Advanced Interventional Sys., 824 F. Supp. 583, 585 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 21 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 1994) (the court equated the phrase style of doing business with the term trade dress, which refers to the packaging or labeling of goods); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Advanced Interventional Sys., slip op at 4 (citing Medd v. Boyd Wagner, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Ohio 1955)) (California law) ("[tlhe term 'style of doing business,' as it appears in the insurance policy, has been used by courts to refer to a company's comprehensive manner of operating its business.... essentially the same concept as the more widely used term: 'trade dress' [citation]"); Shakeys, Inc. v. Martin, 430 P.2d 504 (Idaho 1967); Ross v. Briggs & Morgan, 520 N.W.2d 432, 434, 435 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (claim that insured "prepared advertisements that looked like [the plaintiff's] advertisements" constituted the "taking of advertising ideas or style of doing business"), rev'd, 540 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 1995);

Poof Toy Prods. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 891 F. Supp. 1228, 1233 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (both trademark and trade dress infringement claims are encompassed by the phrase "misappropriation of style of doing business"); Advance Watch Co. v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Co., 878 F Supp. 1034, 1043 (E.D. Mich. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, remanded, 99 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. Mich. 1996) ("the term 'misappropriation of style of doing business'...is broad enough to embrace claims that the insured copied a design explicitly protected by trademark. When the claims are found to arise out of advertising activity, the cases support a finding if insurer liability." Accordingly, trade dress and trademark infringement claims triggered a duty to defend because they "arguably arose, at least in part, from ... the publication of the advertisement catalog" in which the insured falsely designated a connection between the insured's product and the plaintiff's product); American Economy Ins. Co. v Reboans, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 1246, 1254 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (on motion for reconsideration); Dogloo, Inc. v. Northern Ins. Co., 907 F. Supp. 1383, 1388-89 (C.D. Cal. 1995). Contra Advance Watch Co. v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Co., 99F.3d 795, 802 (6th Cir. Mich. 1996), reh'g, en banc, denied, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 34340 (6th Cir Dec. 30, 1996) (Michigan law) ("the term 'misappropriation of advertising ideas of style of doing business' ...refers to category of actionable conduct separate from trademark and trade dress infringement").

[Back to Text]


2 E.g., Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Badger Medical Supply Co., 191 Wis.2d 229, 528 N.W.2d 486, 490 (1995) ("An 'advertising idea' is an idea for calling public attention to a product or business, especially by proclaiming desirable qualities so as to increase sales or patronage").

[Back to Text]


3 E.g., id. ("'Style of doing business' is a phrase used by the courts to refer to a company's comprehensive manner of operating its business"); Sentex Sys. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 882 F. Supp. 930, 942 (C.D. Cal. 1995), aff'd, 93 F. 3d 578, 96 C.D.O.S. 6156, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10105 (9th Cir. 1996) ("style of doing business" refers to manner or method in which a business is conducted); Poof Toy Prods. v. United Stated Fidelity & Guar Co., 891 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (E.D. Mich 1995) ("' style of doing business,' as it appears in the insurance policy, refers to a company's 'comprehensive manner of operating its business'"); Applied Bolting Tech. Prods. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 942 F. Supp.1029, 1034 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

It has been held that "'misappropriation of style of doing business' necessarily involves a competitor." Heritage Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ricart Ford, Inc., 105 Ohio App. 3d 261, 663 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (1995). But see Tynan's Nissan v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 917 P.2d 321,325 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (phrase "style of doing business" does not encompass "a generic style of doing business not related to advertising activities").

[Back to Text]


4 See, e.g., Merchants Co. v. American Motorists Ins Co., 794 F. Supp. 611, 618-19 (N.D. Miss. 1992):

A secondary basis for finding that there is coverage and a duty to defend under the "advertising injury" language of the CGL and Catastrophe policies is the language which prohibits "misappropriation of advertising ideas...... Again, although "advertising ideas" is not defined in either policy, the Court is of the opinion that in the ordinary or popular sense, a customer list may be fairly said to be an "advertising idea." Additionally, the allegations of the Alabama action plainly state that Merchants has purportedly misappropriated AFD's trade secrets. In this connection, the Court is of the opinion that the misappropriation of trade secrets allegations are sufficiently similar to the misappropriation of advertising ideas language of American's policy as to raise a duty to defend and to provide coverage under the policies.

JA Brundage Plumbing & Rotor-Rooter, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Ins Co., 818 F Supp 553, 557-59 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (court held that the offense of trademark infringement was encompassed by the policy term covering "misappropriation of style of doing business"), PJ Noyes Co. v American Motorists Ins. Co., 855 F. Supp. 492, 494-95 (D.N.H. 1994) (trademark infringement claim covered because use of product name in advertising "falls within the ambit of misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business or infringement of title or slogan").

[Back to Text]


5 Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v. BSM Corp., 1993 US Dist LEXIS 4725, pp 17-19 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (held that there was no advertising injury coverage for trademark infringement under the interpretive principle inclusio unius est exclusio alterios). Contra PJ Noyes Co. v American Motorists Ins. Co., 855 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.H. 1994).

[Back to Text]


6 E.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Advanced Interventional Sys., Civ. No. 92-1634-A (E.D. Va. June 21, 1993) (California law) ("it is nonsense to suppose that if the parties had intended the insurance policy in question to cover patent infringement claims, the policy would explicitly cover infringement of 'copyright title or slogan,' but then include patent infringement, sub silentio, in a different provision"); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v Brotech Corp., 857 F. Supp. 423, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Gencor Indus. v Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 657 F. Supp. 1560, 1564, 1565 (M.D. Fla. 1994):

[The insured] argues that patent infringement and inducement come within the ambit of the listed "offenses" of "misappropriation of advertising idea or style of doing business" and "infringement of title." The court rejects these arguments. Patent infringement and inducement to infringe do not constitute "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business." . . . It is even more absurd to suggest that the phrase "infringement of... title". . . encompasses patent infringement or inducement to infringe. Basic common sense dictates that if these policies covered any form of patent infringement, the word "patent" would appear in the quoted "infringement" clauses.

The court also rejected the assertion that a patent infringement claim was encompassed by the offenses, listed in the policy, of piracy and unfair competition.

The court in Clary Corp. v. Union Standard Ins. Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 489, 494 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1994), said: "When considered in context, 'infringement of title' refers to claims based on the confusion of names or designations, not the slander or disparagement of a third party's legal title to its property.' " Accordingly, the court rejected the insured's claim that there was coverage because the insured's advertising wrongfully indicated that the insured, and not the plaintiff, owned the title to a particular patent. There was no coverage for patent infringement claims.

[Back to Text]


7 See e.g., Merchants Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 794 F. Supp. 611, 618 (S.D. Miss. 1992):

The language in the policy . . . affords coverage for "infringement of copyright, title or slogan." Insofar as AFD alleges in the Alabama action that Merchants improperly utilized the customer list which AFD purchased from Pepsi Cola of Luverne, Inc., the Court finds that the Alabama action may be said to involve an infringement of AFD's title to the customer list. While American argues that infringement should be limited solely to the context of copyrights, that is not what the CGL and Catastrophe policies state. If American had wished to limit infringement solely to copyrights, it had only to say so in its policy. Moreover, since the word "infringement" is not defined in either policy of insurance, the Court must give that term its plain, ordinary or popular sense definition. [Citation omitted.] The popular sense definition of "infringement," as set forth in Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.) is: "A breaking into; a trespass or encroachment upon; a violation of a law, regulation, contract or right." Applying this definition to the allegation that Merchants improperly utilized AFD's customer list without any right or license to do so, the Court concludes that the Alabama action does contain an allegation that Merchants has infringed AFD's title to its customer list.

See generally Ross v Briggs & Morgan, 520 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (alleged wrongful use by insured of a business name similar to the plaintiffs' business name constituted an "infringement of copyright, title or slogan").

[Back to Text]


8 E.g., Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brotech Corp.., 857 F Supp 423, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1994):

A plain reading of the term "infringement of copyright, title or slogan" in the course of advertising activities also would exclude a claim of patent infringement. Isolating the term 'title', Brotech argues that "infringement of title" encompasses patent infringement because a patent is property to which title may be acquired. The very case on which Brotech relies is a trademark case in which the court made clear that in the context of a similar standard "advertising injury" provision the term "title" refers to a distinctive name or designation used to identify a literary or artistic work and not to the legal concept of ownership of property. [Citation omitted]. Under defendant's proffered reading, the insurance companies could be liable under this provision for an insured's theft, misappropriation or conversion of any personal property of another if such were then advertised for sale. The term "infringement of tide" as used in the pertinent policies cannot reasonably be perceived to mean patent infringement.

[Back to Text]


9 Iolab Corp. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 15 F.3d 1500, 1506 (9th Cir. 1994) (California law) (patent infringement does not constitute "piracy"); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brotech Corp., 857 F. Supp. 423, 428 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (patent infringement does not constitute "piracy"); Gencor Indus. v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 857 F. Supp. 1560, 1565-66 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (patent infringement not encompassed by the offense of piracy; piracy refers to misappropriation of the elements of the advertisement itself, not the product being advertised). Contra Davila v. Arlasky, 857 F. Supp. 1258, 1263 (N.D. Ill. 1994) ("we acknowledge that piracy ... might be construed as encompassing the idea of patent infringement").

[Back to Text]


10 See, e.g., Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brotech Corp., 857 F. Supp. 423, 428-29 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that term unfair competition did not encompass a patent infringement claim because the term does not "include within its meaning the violation of a state or federal statutory right," but "refers only to the common law tort"); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Peoples Church of Fresno, 985 F.2d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1993); Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 1254, 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 538, 833 P.2d 545 (1992); A. Meyers & Sons Corp. v Zurich Am. Ins. Group, 74 N.Y.2d 298, 546 N.Y.S.2d 818, 545 N.E.2d 1206 (1989); Graham Resources, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 625 So.2d 716, 721 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Smartfoods, Inc. v. Northbrook Property & Cas. Co., 35 Mass. App. Ct. 239, 618 N.E.2d 1365 (1993); Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Ralph Williams' Northwest Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 81 Wash.2d 740, 504 P.2d 1139, 1141 (1973) (a competitor must have been damaged in order for there to be insurance coverage for damages resulting from unfair competition); Ruder & Finn, Inc. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 52 N.Y.2d 663, 422 N.E.2d 518, 522 (1981) (phrase unfair competition in policy requires that "another's commercial advantage" has been misappropriated); Pine Top Ins. Co. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 676 F. Supp. 212, 216-217 (E.D. Wash. 1987) (the term "'unfair competition' is not to be equated with the far more amorphous term "commercial unfairness'...... 'Unfair competition' is a term of art which must be taken as set forth under the narrow but well-settled common law definition;" accordingly, the court explained, the term unfair competition when used in an insurance policy is limited to the misappropriation of a business "organization or its expenditure of labor, skill and money"). See generally Swanson Broadcasting, Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., 752 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Tex. Ct. App - San Antonio 1988):

Unfair competition is use or simulation by one person of the name, symbols or devices of a business rival in such a manner as is calculated to deceive and cause the public to trade with the first when they intended to and would otherwise have traded with the second.... The doctrine of unfair competition rests on the broad equitable principle that no person may sell or advertise his own business or goods as those of another.

Oliver Gintel, Inc. v. Koslow's, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 236, 239 (N.D. Tex. 1973):

Unfair competition is a form of unlawful business injury which consists essentially, in the passing off or attempting to pass off on the public, the goods or business of one person as and for the business of another, or in the conduct of a trade or business in such a manner that there is either an express or implied representation to that effect.... A competitor may not use a name, whether fictitious or real, or a description, whether or not true which is intended or calculated to represent to the world that his business is that of another, and by such fraudulent misstatements deprive the latter of business which would otherwise come to him.

McCarley v. Welch, 170 S.W.2d 340, 331 (Tex. Ct. App. - Dallas 1943):

Unfair competition has been defined as the use or simulation by one person of the name, symbols or devices of a business rival in such a manner as is calculated to deceive and cause the public to trade with the first when they intended to and would otherwise have traded with the second. The doctrine rests on the broad equitable principle that no person may sell or advertise his own business or goods as those of another.

Boggs v. Whitaker, Lipp & Helea, Inc., 56 Wash. App. 583, 784 P.2d 1273, 1275-76 (1990) (there can be no unfair competition coverage unless a competitor was injured); Globe Indem. Co. v First Am. State Bank, 720 F. Supp. 853, 857 (W.D. Wash. 1989) (an action for unfair competition is available to "a competitor"); Johns-Manville Corp. v. Guardian Indus., 586 F. Supp. 1034, 1073 (E.D. Mich. 1983), affd., 770 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1985) ("Unfair competition is a label designed to reach the conduct of a competitor"); Boron Oil Co. v. Callanan, 50 Mich. App. 580, 213 N.W.2d 836, 838 (1973) ("Ordinarily, one simply cannot be found guilty of unfair competition when the facts indicate no competition"); Water Management, Inc. v. Stayanchi, 15 Ohio St.3d 83, 472 N.E.2d 715, 717 (1984) ("Unfair competition ordinarily consists of representations by one person, for the purpose of deceiving another. [Citation omitted.] The concept of unfair competition may also extend to unfair commercial practices such as malicious litigation, circulation of false rumors, or publication of statements, all designed to harm the business of another"); Gencor Indus. v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 857 F. Supp. 1560, 1566 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (since term unfair competition is limited to claims under the common law, as opposed to statutory claims, it does not encompass a patent infringement claim). See generally Curtis Universal, Inc. v. Sheboygan Emergency Medical Servs., Inc., 43 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (7th Cir. 1994). Contra Parameter Driven Software, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 25 F.3d 332, 336-37 (6th Cir. 1994).

[Back to Text]


11 To constitute an advertisement, a communication should be to the public and constitute an attempt to interest the public in buying a product or service. See, eg., Playboy Enter. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 769 F.2d 426, 426 (7th Cir. 1985) (Illinois law):

The term "advertising" has been defined as follows: "the action of calling something (as a commodity for sale, a service offered or desired) to the attention of the public especially by means of printed or broadcast paid announcements." Wcbster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 31 (1963). This definition requires that the presentation of the item to be sold or approved be made in a medium directed to the public at large.

Freeman v. Greenbriar Homes, Inc., 715 S.W.2d 394, 397 n. 3 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) ("Advertising as distinguished from other forms of communication means to call a matter 'to the public attention' ") (citation omitted); Sassone v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 20 Cal. Rptr. 231, 235 (Cal. App. 1962) (court utilized the following definition of advertise: "to give public notice of; to announce publicly, esp. by a printed notice; as to advertise a sale; hence, to call public attention to"); Fox Chem. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 264 N.W.2d 385, 386 (Minn. 1978) ("The term 'advertising' must be construed in relation to the companion words found in the exclusionary clause. The clause appears to contemplate, as evidenced by the broad terms 'broadcasting' and 'telecasting,' that public or widespread distribution" is what is referred to); McDonough v. Board of Education, 189 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404 (S. Ct. 1959) (court adopted the following definition of advertising: "makes public intimation or announcement of anything, whether by publication in newspapers, or by handbills, or by oral proclamation; the act or practice of bringing anything, as one's wants or one's business, into public notice, as by paid announcements in periodicals or by handbills, placards, etc."); State v. Cusick, 84 N.W.2d 554, 556 (Iowa 1957) (court adopted the analysis of a prior Arkansas Supreme Court decision):

There is a distinction between "soliciting" sales and advertising or an advertisement.... Advertise is defined as: the act or practice of bringing anything, as one's wants or one's business, into public notice.... To solicit is thus defined: to importune, entreat, implore, ask, attempt, try to obtain.... [A]dvertising is a method of, in a broad sense, of soliciting the public to purchase the wares advertised. But soliciting is a well-known and defined action, and advertising is an equally well-known and defined action, and they are not identical.

National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Siliconix, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 77, 80 n. 3 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (quoting dictionary definition of advertising as "to describe or present (a product, organization, idea, etc.) in some medium of communication in order to induce the public to buy, support, or approve it. 2. to call public attention to"); Webster's New Worid Dictionary (2d College Ed.) (defines advertisement as "the act of advertising; a public notice or announcement, usually paid for, as of things for sale, needs, etc.," and defines advertising as "to tell about or praise publicly, as through newspapers, handbills, radio, etc. so as to make people want to buy it"); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1988) (court concluded that offering and selling goods to individual customers was not related to advertising and, therefore, injuries arising out of the activities fell outside an advertising exclusion); International Ins. v. Florists' Mut. Ins., 201 Ill. App.3d 428, 559 N.E.2d 7, 9-10 (1990) (adopting holding that "the term 'advertising' refers to the widespread distribution of promotional material to the public at large"); MGM, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1992 Kan App LEXIS 654 (Oct 9, 1992); Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed at 50 (1979) (defining advertisement as "notice given in manner designed to attract public attention", citing Edwards v. Lubbock County, 33 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. Civ. App.); Smartfoods v. Northbrook Property & Cas. Co., 35 Mass. App. Ct. 239, 618 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1993):

In ordinary usage, never a bad start for analyzing what words signify, advertising means a public announcement to proclaim the qualities of a product or point of view. [Citations omitted-I Wide dissemination of information is typically the objective of advertising. The communication referred to in the Utt complaint which Smartfoods seeks to characterize as advertising is a letter of March 12, 1985, by Smartfoods to Utt that solicits the participation of Utt as a distributor in marketing the Smartfoods product. Such a proposal to a particular company to do business together does not conform to ordinary notions of calling to the attention of the public the merits of a product.... We doubt that every pitch made by one businessman in a letter to another constitutes advertising as the word is understood in American usage.

See also New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. RL Chaides Constr. Co., 847 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Cal. 1994):

Advertising activity must be examined in the context of the overall universe of customers to whom a communication may be addressed.... This court ... concludes here, that where the advertising audience is small but nevertheless constitutes all or a significant portion of the insured's client base, the advertising activity element is satisfied. Hem the advertising was directed on a continuous basis to a significant number of (the insureds customers, not just one or a few.

Ross v. Briggs & Morgan, 520 N.W.2d 432,435 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) ("widely distributed" letter soliciting business constituted advertising).

Some courts, however, have held that a communication need not be addressed to the public in order to constitute advertising. E.g., John Deere Ins. Co. v. Shamrock Indus., 696 F. Supp. 434, 440 (D. Minn. 1988):

If these letters stating the beneficial features of the machine were sent to 100 potential customers, Deere would have no argument that they were not advertising activity. While activity directed at one customer seems to stretch the meaning of advertising, Black's law Dictionary's definition of "advertise" encompasses any form of solicitation, presumably including solicitation of one person. Deere failed to provide in its policy any limitation on the scope of the meaning of advertising activity. If Deere wanted to limit covered advertising activity to "wide dissemination of materials", Deere would have so provided in its policy. Therefore, the court rinds that there is more than one reasonable interpretation of the meaning of "advertising activity", and therefore the policy is ambiguous and must be construed against the insurer.

Demonet Indus. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 278 Cal. Rptr. 178, 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (court held (1) that "advertising includes any activities designed to bring a selicr's goods or services to the attention of potential buyers or to induce them to buy," (2) that "to advertise is 'to advise, announce, apprise, command, give notice to, inform, make known, publish or to call to the public's attention by any means whatever,'" and (3) that "even one-on-one oral representations are advertising"); Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 277 Cal. Rptr. 219, 229 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 2 Cal.4th 1254, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 538 (1992) (same); Feather River Trailer Sailes, Inc. v. Sillas, 96 Cal. App. 3d 324, 158 Cal. Rptr. 26, 34 (1979) ("Historically, the terms 'advertising' and 'advertisement' have been held to be broad enough to include oral representations made on a one-to-one basis").

[Back to Text]


12 See, e.g., Lazzara Oil Co. v. Columbia Gas Co., 683 F. Supp. 777, 779-80 (M.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd, 868 F.2d 1274 (11lth Cir. 1989). The insureds (jobbers of Amoco products) were sued by operators of Amoco service stations for illegal price fixing. The insureds "asserted that the allegation that they compelled the plaintiffs to post certain prices should be considered advertising which constitutes unfair competition. . . ." The court rejected the assertion:

The insurance contracts at issue provide for coverage in the event that advertising causes some type of injury.... There is absolutely no allegation in the [underlying] complaint that such an injury ever resulted from any advertising done.... Advertising done ... whether voluntary or impermissibly compelled, is of no consequence with regard to the insurance policies at issue here.

International Ins. Co. v. Florists' Mut. Ins. Co., 201 Ill. App. 3d 428, 559 N.E.2d 7 (1990):

The allegations in the underlying complaint, which International asserts implicate an advertising injury, stem from FTD's Rule 18(b). The plaintiff in the underlying Fedrral suit alleged that FTD's Rule 18(b) requires FTD member florists, on threat of fine and loss of membership, to send and process all FTD-advertised floral arrangements exclusively through FTD's clearinghouse. It was further alleged in the underlying complaint that FTD interpreted the rule as creating a presumption that FTD-advertised products would be processed through FTD. According to the underlying plaintiff, FI'D's policies with reference to Rule 18(b) thus resulted in unfair competition in derogation of antitrust law.... The fact that the purpose of FTD's Rule 18(b) was to protect its advertising investment is of no consequence when the injury is alleged to have been caused, not by the advertising, but by the rule.... [W]c do not believe that the allegations of the underlying complaint support a conclusion that there is a causal connection between FTD advertising activity and the injury alleged in the Federal suit. International's next argument is that if the allegations of the underlying Federal complaint alone did not put Florists on notice of its duty to defend, the complaint together with unpicaded facts that Florists learned of after the filing of the complaint triggered its duty to defend.... Eswntially, International alleges that as the underlying case developed, Florists came into possession of documents that indicated that FTD's Rule I B(b) was promulgated and enforced to prevent other clearinghouses from taking a "free ride" on FTD's advertising.... As we have stated above, the fact that FTD's Rule 18(b) was promulgated to protect its advertising expense is not causally connected to the injury alleged in the underlying antitrust suit.

Davila v. Arlasky, 857 F. Supp. 1258, 1263 (N.D. Ill. 1994) ("there must be a proximate causal connection between the advertising activity and the [covered offense, and further ... the alleged 'advertising injury' which causes the injury must occur in the very act of advertising"). See generally Sentry Ins. v. RJ Weber Co. Inc., 2 F.3d 554, 557 (5th Cir. 1993) (infringement claim for sales of copyrighted material has no connection to insured's advertising activity, thereby precluding policy coverage); Jerry Madison Enters. v. Grasant Mfg. Co., (S.D.N.Y. Feb 15, 1990) (the insured was sued because it had manufactured and "marketed" (through advertising) copies of copyrighted jewelry without permission; the insured argued that since the complaint alleged advertising injury, the insurer had a duty to defend; the court entered summary judgment in favor of the insurer, holding that there was no coverage because the plaintiffs injury arose out of the infringing manufacture and sale of the jewelry, not out of the advertising):

To read the policy as [the insured] requests would impose a duty to defend and indemnify under the [advertising injury] clause whenever a defendant in a copyright case advertises allegedly infringing goods. In this case, it is irrelevant whether [the insured's] distribution of brochures actually was "advertising activity," because the complaint does not allege injury arises out of these brochures, but rather focuses on the infringing manufacture and sale of the jewelry. (opinion, p. 6) ... [the insured's] sale of earrings through advertising does not invoke the policies' coverage, because plaintiff never alleged that defendant's advertising infringed the copyright.

Sentry Ins. v. Flom's Corp., 818 F. Supp. 187, 191 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (court held that there was no coverage for price-fixing claim made against the insured because the plaintiff had been damaged by the price-fixing, not by advertising):

A thorough review of the complaint riled [against the insured] shows that the underlying complaint contains no allegations that the injury from defendants' price-fixing activities resulted from any advertising done by defendants; rather, the complaint alleges that the injury suffered by the third-party plaintiffs resulted strictly from the defendants' unlawful price-fixing activities.... Defendants in the instant case have argued that, because they advertising the prices which were reached through unlawful price-fixing activity, this Court should hold that the alleged injury suffered by the plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuit arose out of the defendants' advertising activity. As stated previously, a review of the underlying plaintiffs' complaint shows that plaintiffs are claiming that their injury arose out of defendants' price-fixing activity and not the defendants' advertising of the unlawfully agreed-upon prices. Thus, this Court holds that Sentry did not obligate themselves to defend the defendants against the claims riled in the Dry Cleaning lawsuit.

But see John Deere Ins. Co. v. Shamrock Indus., 696 F. Supp. 434, 440 (D. Minn. 1988) (the plaintiff was sued for both patent infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets, and the court held that the latter arguably arose out of advertising activity); Iron Home Builders, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 30 USPQ2d 1059 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (copyright infringement claim covered despite the absence of any causal nexus between the offense and advertising, but insurer failed to raise the foregoing as a coverage defense).

[Back to Text]


13 E.g., PJ Noyes Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 855 F. Supp. 492, 494-95 (D.N.H. 1994) (trademark infringement occurred as a result of use of infringing words in advertising, thereby satisfying the requisite causal connection to advertising activities); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Pencon Int'l. Inc., 922 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1991) (California law) (court held that a trademark infringement claim was not covered because it did not involve advertising, but apparently only because the complaint did not allege that the infringing trademark had been advertised, and the insured "failed to make any showing that its alleged acts occurred 'in the course of advertising' as required by the policy").

[Back to Text]


14 See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Siliconix, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 77, 80 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (court granted the insurer summary judgment on the ground that a patent infringement claim was not covered as a matter of law because "patent infringement does not occur in the course of advertising;" the court reasoned (1) that "the infringing act is the making, using, or selling of a patented invention, not the mere advertising of the invention," and (2) that, as a result, although advertising is related to the selling of an infringing product, there was no coverage for a patent infringement claim under a policy extending coverage to an offense "occurring in the course of the named insured's advertising activities"); Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 1254, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 538 (1992) (the supreme court, quoting a portion of the Siliconix opinion with approval, stated as follows: "A claim of patent infringement does not 'occur in the course of advertising activities' within the meaning of the policy even though the insured advertises the infringing product, if the claim of infringement is based on the sale or importation of the product rather than its advertisement"); Sentry Ins. v Flom's Corp., 818 F. Supp. 187, 191 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (court quoted, with approval, the discussion in the Siliconix case that patent infringement claim was not covered because the plaintiffs injury was caused by the infringement, not by the advertising); A Meyers & Sons Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Group, 74 N.Y.S.2d 298, 546 N.Y.S.2d 818, 821 (App. Div. 1969) (the insured was sued for patent infringement; under the advertising injury language of the policy at issue, the insurer provided coverage for an offense "occurring in the course of named insured's advertising activities;" the court held that there was no coverage and no duty to defend because the "alleged harm arose out of the importation and sale of products which infringed upon patents. . ., not injury arising out of [the insureds] advertising activities;" the court concluded that "it is clear that the policy, when read in context, does not cover acts ... arising out of the illegal manufacturing ... and sale of goods in violation of another's patent rights"); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. RL Chaides Constr. Co., 847 F. Supp. 1452,1456-59 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (claim of inducing infringement also not covered); Intex Plastics Sales Co. v. United Nat. Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 254, 256 (9th Cir. 1994) (California law); Everest & Jennings, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 229 (9th Cir. 1994) (California law); Gitano Group, Inc. v Kemper Group, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 277 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1994); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brotech Corp., 857 F. Supp. 423, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1994):

Even if patent infringement were included in the specified acts defining "advertising injury," the claim in the underlying complaint would not trigger a duty to defend. Even where a claim is for conduct specified in the definition of advertising injury, courts have consistently held that there must be a causal connection between the injury alleged in the underlying complaint and the insured's advertising activity. Since the gravamen of patent infringement is the unauthorized production, use or sale of a patented product and not its advertisement, it could not arise out of or occur in the course of advertising activities .... The claim is that "Brotech has been infringing the claims of Rohm and Haas" by using and/or selling products defined by the claims of Rohm and Haas patents and/or using and/or selling products made by the processes defined by the claims of Rohm and Haas patents." There is no causal nexus between this alleged injury and the advertising activities of the insured. The mere advertising of a patented product would not support a claim of patent infringement and the advertising of a patented product is not an element of a patent infringement claim.

Iolab Corp. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 15 F.3d 1500, 1505-07 (9th Cir. 1994) (no causal nexus between patent infringement claim and insured's advertising activity, thereby precluding coverage); Federal Ins. Co. v. Microsoft Corp., No C92-61 OD, slip op at 12-13 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 15, 1993) (in order for there to be advertising coverage, the advertising itself must have constituted an infringement; it is not enough merely that the injury occurred in the course of advertising activity); Gencor Indus. v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 857 F. Supp. 1560, 1564 (M.D. Fla. 1994) ("direct patent infringement cannot be committed in the course of advertising activities"); Davila v. Arlasky, 857 F. Supp. 1258, 1263 (N.D. Ill. 1994):

The plaintiffs simply have failed to establish any causal connection between the patent infringement alleged in this case and any advertising activity, despite the fact that the infringing product was advertised and may have been sold, in part, through advertising.... This rationale also applies to the inducing infringement claim. While inducing infringement may involve advertising activity, that does not appear to be true here.

[Back to Text]









Back to Top

Copyright © 1999 Ference & Associates. All Rights Reserved. Legal Information.